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ESTATE OF V AN DEUSEN 
[30 C.2d 285; 182 P.2d 565] 
[L. A. No. 19800. In Bank. June 24, 1947.] 
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of FLORENCE LENORE VAN DEUSEN, Deceasad. 
GLADYS VAN DEUSEN BRIGHT et ai., Respondents, 
v. BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST AND 
. SAVINGS ASSOCIATION. Appellant. 
, 
) 'l'rusta-Execution-lnstructions as to Administration - PeU-
.. tion-Hearing.-Although a petition of beneficiaries of a testa-
:. mentary trust for instructions to the trustee respectin~ pay-
. menta of income for their support may be filed before the 
appointment of a trustee and before the decree of distribution, 
the probate court has jurisdiction to hear the petition after 
the appointment of a trustee, an order of ratable distribution, 
appearance of the trustee to contest the granting of the 
sought. 
Estates-Final Distribution-Decree-Oonclusive-
""--A decree of distribution is a dnal and conclusive con-
"'ai:rnclticln of the will as against all interested parties, including 
~~etlcsiaJ1es of a testamentary trust. 
lei. - New 'trial. - Prob. Code, § 1231, relating to new 
in probate proceedings, does not authorize the probate 
to grant a new trial on a petition for directions to a 
. trustee after the petition had been denied and 
of distribution was made. 
'DI..-'LTIlU b7 J1117.-There is no right to demand a jury trial 
probate proceeding unless that right is granted by statute. 
1~'D1"-EJQI!:esa 'lruBts-Mocilllcation.-A court of equity may 
a trust on a proper showing of changed conditions 
;Merurri!ur after the creating of a trust if the rights of all the 
'IItitleflciILriE!S may be protected . 
• ;';"'lbJmtlss 'trnsts--Modi1lcation.-Assuming that a probate 
has the power to modify a testamentary trust under 
Code, § 1120, an order granting a petition of beneficiaries 
trust tor instructions to the trustee respecting payments 
of income is erroneons where it provides tor an invasion 
1:-~1JOr4~ of distribution as res judicata as to construction Q! 
A.L.B. 1180, 1185. See, also, lIB Cal.Jur. 787; 21 
53 Am.Jur. 74. 
References: [1] Trusts, § 346; [2] Decedents' Estates, 
[3] Decedents' Estates, § 1127; [4) Decedents' Estates, 
[6-7] Trusts, § 92. 
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of the corpus of the trust contraty to the express provisions 
of the decree of distribution without any attempt to protect 
the interests of the residuaty beneficiaries in that corpus and 
without their consent, and contraty to the provisions of the 
trust instrument. 
(7) Id.-Expresa Trusta-lIocWlcation.-The mere decrease, since 
execution of a will, of the income from securities distributed as 
the corpus of a trust and a testator's expressed desire to pro-
vide adequately for the beneficiaries do not empower a court 
to deprive residuaty beneficiaries of their interests in the 
trust without their consent. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los An-
geles County directing trustee to pay certain money from an 
estate. Thomas C. Gould, Judge. Reversed. 
William K. Young, Brady & Nossaman and Walter L. 
Nossaman for Appellant. 
Ben C. Cohen and Leonard Bartigan for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Florence Lenore Van Deusen by her will 
dated June 20, 1932, left the residue of her estate to American 
Security and Trust Company of Washington. D. C., as trustee, 
for the following purposes: " ... to pay over the net income 
arising therefrom, in equal shares, unto by aforesaid daugh. 
ters.Gladys Van Deusen Bright and Hazel Van Deusen Lee, 
during the period of their joint lives. and in case of the death 
of either of them. then all of said net income unto the survivor, 
for and during the natural life of the survivor. Upon the 
death of the survivor of my said daughters. this trust shall 
finally cease and determine. and my trustee shall thereupOb 
transfer. assign and pay over the entire trust fund. including 
any undistributed income. abRolutely and in fee simple. in 
equal shares unto those of my grandchildren who may then 
be living, the then surviving L'IS1le. however of any of. them 
who may then be dead. t.o take. per stirpes, the same part or 
share the deceased ancestor would have taken if living." 
The testatrix died on April 10. 1944. and the will was ad-
mitted to probate on June 13, 1944. The named trustee de-
clined to act, and Bank of America National Trust and 
Savings Association was appointed a.dministrator·with·the· 
will-annexed. On March 22. 1945, thp. dOllghtel'R of the testa· 
trix, the life beneficiaries of the trust, filed a "Petition for 
/ 
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1;''IlJlreetlOJltS to Trustee" with the probate court. The purpose 
petiti(Jln was to have the trustee, when appointed, in-
1i"t:rrJicled to pay each of the life beneficiaries at least $200 a 
out of income, if that was sufficient, but if not, out 
corpus of the trust. It is aUeged in the petition that 
made by the testatrix for her daughters was 
to provide them with enough income to take care of 
,::" ___ ~I- that it wa.~ contemplated at the time the will was 
that the net income from the trust investments would 
$400 a month, and that the testatrix intended that 
than $200 a month would be available for each daugh-
F'lrhlU!l" the trust. It is also alleged that since the creation 
one of the daughters has been afflicted with a dis-
hA11;mrM to be incurable and needs special medical care 
the other daughter must rely entirely upon the in-
iiiIIiiI":hnm the trust for the necessities of life. 
3. 1945. Bank of America Trust and Savings 
_a.ti~m was appointed trustee, and by order for ratable 
!'Hhl1tiCID' a part of the residue of the estate was distributed 
On the same day the "Petition for DirectioJlt8 
rftliiBt4!!e"" was denied. The order for ratable distribution 
"The Trustee shall pay in equal shares to Gladys 
:;.;00.',", ___ •• _ Bright and Hazel Van Demen Lee during the 
their joint lives, and in case of the death of either 
" to the survivor for and during the natural life 
..... ..,;':Tn .. , all of the net income arising from said trust 
death of both of decedent's daughters, said 
~Iiha.ll distribute the corpus of the trust estate in equal 
the grandchildren of decedent who may then be liv-
'·the event of any of said grandchildren not sur-
his or her share shall be distributed to his or 
issue in equal shares and per stirpes, and 
trust shall cease and terminate." 
!.NP.nts!mlV>.l' 12. 1945. the probate court made its order 
Fdiistribultio:n. distributing the balance of the residue 
"in trust for the uses and purposes set forth in 
for Ratable Di~ribution, dated April 3, 1945 .... " 
was taken from either order of distribution. Rome-
April 3, 1945 (the record does not disclose the 
order) a new trial was granted on the "Petition 
'lftletiIOJlt8 to Trustee" and another hearing was held on 
on February 14, 1946. On the basis of the rf\COrd 
) 
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at the original hearing on the petition, the court entered its 
order granting the petition of the life beneficiaries for direc-
tions to the trustee to pay each of them at least $200 a month, 
after a showing that the net income of the trust at that time 
was sufficient to pay each beneficiary from $100 to $125 a 
month only. This order was based on a finding by the pro-
bate court "that the main benefits under said trust were 
intended for the petitioners herein who were the primary ob-
jects of the testatrix's solicitude and that the primary purpose 
of the trust could not be accomplished by a strict adherence 
to the terms of the declaration of the trust . . . and that it 
is the purpose of said trust that the said petitioners herein 
receive the sum of $200 each per month." From this order 
the trustee, who appeared at the hearing in opposition to the I 
petition, appeals. 
The trustee contends that the probate court was without 
jurisdiction to make the order on the grounds that respond-
ents' petition was not a proper petition under section 1120 
of the Probate Code, that the new trial on the petition after 
the final decree of distribution constituted a collateral attack 
on the final decree of distribution, that the probate court was 
without jurisdiction to modify the trust pursuant to section 
1120, and that if the probate court had jurisdiction and the 
matter was not conclusively determined by the final decree 
of distribution, the probate court erred in ordering an in-
vasion of the corpus of the trust contrary to the express 
terms of the decree of distribution and of the will itself. 
Probate Code section 1120 provides: "When a trust created 
by will continues after distribution, the superior court shall 
not lose jurisdiction of the estate by final distribution, but 
shall retain jurisdiction for the purpose of determining to 
whom the property shall pass and be delivered upon final or 
partial termination of the trust, to the extent that such de-
termination is not concluded by the decree of distribution, 
or settling the accounts and passing upon the acts of the 
trustee and for the other purposes hereinafter set forth . 
.Any trustee appointed by will, or appointed to execute a 
trust created by will, may from time to time pending the 
execution of his trust, or at the termination thereof, render 
for settlement his accounts and report his acts as such trustee 
before the Stlperior court in which the will was probated .... 
The trustee may also petition such court, from time to time, 
for instructions as to the administration of the trust. ••• The 
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shall cause notice of the hearing to be mailed to the 
,,,,,.~]~es at their last known addresses .... " 
been held that a beneficiary as well as a trustee may 
the court for instructions to trustees pursuant to this 
(Estate of Marre, 18 Ca1.2d 184, 186 (114 P.2d 586].) 
never been decided, however, whether the petition 
med before the appointment of a trustee and before 
im:nti,1)Jl. It is clear that the section applies only to testa-
that continue after distribution. and most of 
ftWlWdmlB expressly refer to action taken after distribu-
Estate of Smith, 4 Cal.App.2d 548. 552 [41 P.2d 
. stated that "the language employed in the present 
the Probate Code was intended to broaden the 
of the probate court so as to give that court 
over practically all controversies which might 
liet'WeE!Il the trustees and those claiming to be beneficiaries 
trust." (Quoted with approval in Estate of Smead, I 
20,24 [82 P.2d 1821.) 
is nothing in section 1120 that specifies that 
. i$ling the petition. although it seems clear that it 
. be heard and determined before the trustee is 
has received distribution of at leastsom& of 
(See Estate of Bey, 31 Cal.App.2d 648. 653 [88 
The trustee contends that since the "trustee" I 
to man notiee to the beneficiaries, the petition 
until a trustee is appointed who can carry out 
. Since the clause providing for the petition has 
. apply to petitions filed by beneficiaries, although 
refers only to a petition of trustees (Estate of 
there is no reason why the petitioning bene-
not satisfy the notice requirements of the 
:4J:tn()UA~ the petition was filed before the decree of 
before the appointment of a trustee, its prayer 
lINeti4)ns to the trustee that the court appoints, and it 
. the appointment of the trustee and the order 
","",' •• U"UJIVU. and the trustee appeared to contest 
of the relief sought. The probate court had 
hear the petition at that time. 
contends that the orders of distribution were 
r'Col[lcl,18i~re with respect to respondents' rights under 
that the probate court had no power to grant a 
the petition thereafter. [2] With ~pect to 
j 
) 
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the construction of the will, the decree of distribution was 
clearly conclusive as to the rights of the beneficiaries to an 
invasion of the corpus. By the order for ratable distribution 
of April 3, 1945, incorporated in the decree of final distribu-
tion of September 12, 1945, the probate court directed that the 
net income be paid to respondents and that the corpus be 
distributed to the grandchildren of the testatrix on the death 
of the surviving life beneficiary. A decree of distribution is a 
t1nal and conclusive construction of the will as against all 
interested parties, including beneficiaries of a testamentary 
trust. (Estate of Loring, 29 Ca1.2d 423, 428 [175 P.2d 524]; 
Estate of Easter, 24 Ca1.2d 191, 194 [148 P.2d 601]; Prob. 
Code, § 1021; cases collected 136 A.L.R. 1180, 1185.) "The 
administration of a decedent's estate involves a series of 
separate proceedings, each of which is intended to be final ... II: 
not only as to the parties who appear therein, but also as to 
all persons 'interested in the estate.' ... In fact, it is un-
doubtedly because all such persons were to be bound by 
various orders and decrees entered in the course of the ad-
ministration of the estate. that the Legislature expressly 
provided that they might appear and protect their rights in 
the proceedings that lead to such orders and decrees. (See 
Prob. Code, §§ 361,370,407.442,522,584, 681, 756, 810, 831, 
841, 860, 921, 922, 927, 1000, 1010. ]020. ]200.)" (Estate 0/ 
Loring, supra, at p. 428.) 
Among such proceedings are those for ratable distribution 
(§ 1010) and final distribution (§ 1020). Any question of 
construction of the will in favor of the respondents should 
therefore have been determined either at the time of the order 
for ratable distribution or the decree of final distribution. 
The life beneficiaries. however, contend that the petition 
was filed to obtain a modification of the trust to carry out 
the actual intention of the testatrix rather than to obtain a 
favorable construction of the will. That this is the theory 
on which the order was granted is shown by the probate 
court's t1nding after the new trial "that the primary purpose 
of the trust could not be accomplished by a strict adherence 
to the terms of the declaration of the trust expressed in said 
last Will and Testament .... " [3a] The original order on 
respondents' petition was one of denial and no appeal was 
filed therefrom. Subsequently a new trial was granted on the i 
petition, and the issue remainR whether the probate court bad . 
jurisdiction to grant a new trial. Section 1231 of the Probate 
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. lists the cases in which a probate court has jurisdiction 
. . a new trial: "A motion for a new trial in probate 
&0CE!edin8:S can be made only in cases of contests of wills, 
or after probate, in proceedings to determine 
and interests in estates, and in those cases where the 
fact, of which a new trial is sought, were of such 
as to entitle the parties to have them tried by a jury 
or not they were so tried." 
pr;ooeedllllg involved in the present case was not a will 
Nor was it a proceeding under the second category 
in section 1231. The phrase "Proceedings to deter-
jt:lleil~lp and interests in estates" refers to the special 
ieeClinl~ under section 1080 of the Probate Code. Under 
tiW!tiQ][l. "any person claiming to be an heir or entitled to 
:unLjJo\J'U of any part of the estate of a decedent may file 
in the pending probate proceedings to have the 
°Ufllert.a.1n and declare the rights of himself and all others 
iB~.-'.Y or any interest therein." (Trout v. Ogilvie, 41 
167, 174 [182 P. 333}.) In such proceedings, how-
petltlo,ner is not entitled to be heard unless he claims 
heir, and when such a claim is made, "The court 
j1lrisdiction to determine, and it is made its duty to 
.' not alone the heirship to said deceased but the 
each respective claimant to his estate." (In re 
Cal. 689, 694 (45 P. 6}.) 
. eategory specified in section 1231 of the Probate 
. ,"Those cases where the issues of fact, of which 
is sought were of such a character as to entitle 
to have them tried by a jury .... " [4] There 
to demand a jury trial in a probate proceeding 
is granted by statute. (Estate of England, 
300 [5 P.2d 428]; Estate of Land, 166 Cal. 538, 
246].) If it is assumed therefore that the new 
:~an1;ed on an issue of fact, namely, the purpose and 
testatrix in executing the trust provisions of 
question remains whether there is a statute pro-
, . a right to a jury trial of that issue in a proceeding 
° section 1120 of the Probate Code. If there is any 
au:thOlrlt:y for a jury trial in such a case, it must be 
Uf·ltt:CI.1UlJ.lS 1230 and 1233 of the Probate Code. Section 
that" All issues of fact joined in probate pro-
lI!8-:mUl!lt be tried in conformity with the requirements of 
l)nLetlI~e in civil actions. The party affirming is plain-
./ 
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ti« and the one denying or avoiding is defendant." Section 
1233 provides that "the provisions of Part 2 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure . • . constitute the rules of practice in the 
proceedings mentioned in this code with regard to trials .••. " 
It was held 1Ulder former sections 1713 and 1716 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure, on which these sections are based, that a 
party to a probate proceeding had a right to demand a jury 
trial if there is a statutory authority for the formation of issues 
of fact on the issue joined. (Bstat. of Baird, 173 Cal. 617, 
620 [160 P. 1078].) This rule has been applied 1Ulder the 
Probate Code to an issue of fact raised 1Ulder Probate Code 
section 1020 authorizing an interested party to resist the appli-
eation for a decree of distribution. (Estat. of P.rki"", 21 
Ca1.2d 561, 567 [134 P.2d 231].) Section 1120, however, 
makes no provision for such issues of fact and it has been 
held that there is no right to a jury trial and therefore no 
right to a new trial in proceedings there1Ulder to settle the 
accounts of a testamentary trustee. (E.tat. of Smead, 12 
Cal.2d 20, 24 [82 P.2d 182].) Moreover, even if there were 
such a right to a jury trial, the analogous eivil action 1Ulder 
section 1230 would be an action by the respondents against the 
trustee and the remaindermen to determine the extent of their 
rights in the trust. Such an action in equity does not give 
the parties a right to a jury trial. (Cau1uJp. v. S.curity Soo-
ing. Bank, 127 Cal. 197, 201 [59 P.2d 589].) 
[Sb] Since Probate Code section 1231 provides the only 
authority for the granting of new trials in probate proceed-
ings and does not authorize the granting of a new trial in a 
proceeding such as the present one, the probate court lacked 
jurisdiction to make the order appealed from. (DitJmond v. 
Superior Courl,189 Cal. 732, 740 [210 P. 36].) 
Even if it be assumed that the probate court had jurisdic-
tion to grant a new trial on respondent's petition for instruc-
tions to the trustee, the order appealed from is erroneous on 
its merits. The theory of the order, and the only basis for 
granting it after the decree of distribution, was to allow a 
/ modi1ieation or deviation from the trust to earry out the pur-
I pose of the testatrix in view of changed conditions. [0] A 
court of equity may modify a trust on a proper showing of 
changed conditions oceurring after the creation of a trust if 
the rights of aU the beneficiaries may be protected. (Whit-
tingham v. California f'f'UBt Co., 214 Cal. 128, 134 [4 P.2d 
142]; Adams v. Cook, 15 Cal.2d ·352, 358 [101 P.2d 4841; 
Jlo~ v. f'ifle I'MUNnu " f'f'Wf Co., 27 Cal2d 457, 466-
I 
/ 
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P.2d 15J; see Rest. Trusts, §§ 167, 168; Scott on 
11167, 168.) [6] If it is assumed that a probate 
the same power under section 1120, the order ap-
is nevertheless erroneous, since it provides for 
fi'f:asi(m of the corpus of the trust contrary to the express 
of the decree of distribution without any attempt 
the interests of the residuary beneficiaries in that 
.. w".;._' interest given respondents in either the will or the 
distril~ution is the net income from the corpus. The 
itfe1trlldren of the testatrix, ehildren of the respondents, 
,.titled to distribution of the corpus on the death of the 
'respondent. To allow an invasion of the corpus 
. .' consent of the residuary beneficiaries contrary 
Dro~,ons of the trust instrument is to take property 
lblet,'Wiithc)ut his consent and give it to another. (See 3 
I" SDlP8l~ Trusts and Trustees, 504.) As stated in the 
IIPILen, of Trusts (§ 168, comment d.) "The court will 
, direct the application of the principal to the 
~'tlldllLcatjon of one beneficiary where by the terms of 
t:DlLcoDle only is to be so applied, if the result would 
l8Dl!'iVe another beneficiary of property to which he is 
beCc)1l1e entitled by the terms of the trust, whether the 
.. such other beneficiary is vested or contingent, or 
. other beneficiary consents to such application." 
"Hug""" v. Pederal Trust Co., 119 N.J.Eq. 502, 
2991; Scott on Trusts, § 168.) 
nfffl1~1I~m 'f. California Trust Co., 214 Cal. 128, 134 
. the claimant, a beneficiary of a testamentary 
"= ... =._ only person interested in the estate. It was 
of equity could modify the trust to allow 
part of the corpus to the beneficiary on a 
of the beneficiaries' need therefor and of 
l,Wms1tancee occurring since the execution of the 
present case, the respondent life beneficiaries 
'only persons interested in the trust, and the 
residuary beneficiaries must be protected. The 
contend, however, that the probate court did 
protect the interests of the residuary beneficiaries, 
trustee had no right to attempt to do so, since 
~idwlLry beneficiaries were all served with notice 
of the petition and two of them, who appeared 
~~.ec:runseI, stated that they had no objection to in-
pqmeuta to $150. This can llard1¥ be eon-
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sidered consent by all the residuary beneficiaries to an in-
vasion of the corpus of the trust to provide each of the life 
beneficiaries with at least $200 a month. 
Moreover, in Estate of Markham, 28 Ca1.2d 69, 74 [168 P.2d 
669], it was held by this court that where the trust instru-
ment provides for payments to a life beneficiary out of net 
income, there may be no invasion of the corpus or of accumu-
lated income "in the absence of a clear expression to the con-
trary in the trust instrument." The respondents contend 
that the rule of the Markham case is confined to a situation 
where there is a fully expressed plan or purpose set forth in 
the trust instrument and that in the present case there was 
no plan or purpose shown by the will itself. Even if this 
limitation of the rule might be applied in a proper case, 
respondents have failed to show by parol evidence or other-
wise that the testatrix clearly intended an invasion of the 
corpus, if necessary, to provide each of the daughters with 
an income of $200 a month. 
[7] The conditions as to the health and need of the re-
spondents were stipulated to by the trustee at the hearing. 
The only other evidence of changed conditions after the 
execution of the will in 1932 is that the income from the 
securities that were distributed as the corpus of the trust de-
creased sometime between 1932 and the date of the original 
hearing on the petition. The evidence introduced by re-
spondents consisted only of the testimony of the husband 
of one of the life beneficiaries that he was the financial 
adviser of the testatrix, that at the time of the execution of 
the will in 1932, the testatrix received $400 a month income 
from the securities in question; that at that time she told the 
witness that she expected that her daughters would receive 
a similar income therefrom under the trust. The witness 
also testified that in 1943, the testatrix stated in a letter 
that "I wW arrange it so that it will be used to the advan-
tage of Gladys and Hazel [the respondents], no others." 
(Italics added.) He also testified that the testatrix did 
made a statement· "with respect to seeing that her children 
were not impoverished as a result of illness or any unforeseen 
contingencies." (Italic.'~ added.) This evidence, whether ad-
missible or not, shows only that in 1932 the testatrix expected 
the income from her securities to remain at approximately 
$400 a month after her death and that in 1943 she contem-
plated changing her will to provide Rolely for her daughters. 
Nevertheless the will admitted to probate provided for her 
JOt Shenk, JOt Edmonds, Jo, Carter, Jo, Schauer, 
t::5p1ence, Jo, concurred. 
petition for a rehearing was denied July 
